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Introduction 
 
The paper is divided into four parts. In the first part, we shall summarise the main 
components of a political-ecological perspective, with particular reference to questions of 
urban socio-environmental sustainability. The central themes of a political-ecological 
rendition of the urban process and of the urban water cycle will be outlined. In a second 
part, the critical moments with respect to the contemporary organisation, management, 
and dynamics of the urban water cycle will be explored, with particular reference to the 
findings of the case studies. In a third part, the relevance of these dynamics with respect 
to the question of sustainability will be explored, while the final part will tease out some 
conclusions with respect to urban sustainability. 
 
1. Political-Ecological Perspectives on Urbanisation 
 
1.1. Urbanising Political-Ecology 
 
Over the past few years and in the wake of the resurgence of the environmental 
question on the political agenda, a growing body of work has emerged on either the 
environmental implications of urban change or on issues related to urban sustainability 
(Haugthon and Hunter, 1994; Satterthwaite, 1999). In many, if not all, of these cases, the 
environment is defined in terms of a set of ecological criteria pertaining to the ‘natural’ 
milieu. Both urban sustainability as well as the environmental impacts of the urban 
process are primarily understood in terms of physical or biological environmental 
conditions and characteristics. Political-ecological perspectives start from a radically 
different position (Benton, 1996; Braun and Castree, 1998; Burgess, et al., 1997;  Keil, 
2000;  O’Connor, 1998; Peet and Watts,1996; Ward, 1997; Swyngedouw, 1999). 
Although highly variegated, political-ecological approaches share some common 
characteristics:  
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1. Environmental and social changes co-determine each other (Norgaard, 1994). 
Processes of socio-environmental change transform both social and physical 
environments and produce social and physical milieus with new and distinct 
qualities. In other words, environments are combined socio-physical constructions 
that are actively and historically produced, both in terms of social content and 
physical-environmental qualities (Escobar; 2001; Latour, 1993; 1999).  
2. There is nothing a-priory unnatural about produced environments like cities, 
dammed rivers, or irrigated fields (Harvey, 1996). Produced environments are 
specific historical results of socio-environmental processes.  
3. The type and character of physical and environmental change, and the resulting 
environmental conditions are not independent from the specific historical social, 
cultural, political, or economic conditions and the institutions that accompany 
them (Swyngedouw 1997; 1999).  
4. All socio-spatial processes are invariably also predicated upon the transformation 
or metabolism of physical, chemical, or biological components (Swyngedouw, 
1996).  
5. These metabolisms produce a series of both enabling and disabling social and 
environmental conditions. Indeed, these produced milieus often embody 
contradictory tendencies. While environmental (both social and physical) qualities 
may be enhanced in some places and for some people, they often lead to a 
deterioration of social and physical conditions and qualities elsewhere (Peet and 
Watts, 1993; Keil and Graham, 1998; Laituri and Kirby, 1994).  
6. Processes of socio-environmental change are, therefore, never socially or 
ecologically neutral. This results in conditions under which particular trajectories 
of socio-environmental change undermine the stability or coherence of some 
social groups or places, while the sustainability of social groups and places 
elsewhere might be enhanced. In sum, the political-ecological examination of the 
urbanization process reveals the inherently contradictory nature of the process of 
socio-environmental change and teases out the inevitable conflicts (or the 
displacements there-off) that infuse socio-environmental change.  
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7. Particular attention, therefore, is paid to social power relations (whether material 
or discursive, economic, political, and/or cultural) through which socio-
environmental processes take place. It is these power geometries and the social 
actors carrying them that ultimately decide who will have access to or control 
over, and who will be excluded from access to or control over, resources or other 
components of the environment. These power geometries, in turn, shape the 
particular social and political configurations and the environments in which we 
live. 
8. Questions of socio-environmental sustainability become hereby fundamentally 
political questions. Political-ecology attempts to tease out who gains from and 
who pays for, who benefits from and who suffers (and in what ways) from 
particular processes of socio-environmental change. It also seeks answers to 
questions about what or who needs to be sustained and how this can be 
maintained or achieved.  
9. Political-ecological perspectives seek to unravel the nature of the social 
relationships that unfold between individuals and social groups and how these, in 
turn, are mediated by and structured through processes of ecological change 
(Cutter, 1995). In other words, environmental transformation is not independent 
from class, gender, ethnic, or other power struggles.  
10. It also seeks to question the actual processes of environmental re-construction 
and re-casting and advocates a position on sustainability that is achieved by means 
of a democratically controlled and organised process of socio-environmental (re)-
construction. The political program, then, of political-ecology is to enhance the 
democratic content of socio-environmental construction by means of identifying 
the strategies through which a more equitable distribution of social power and a 
more inclusive mode of environmental production can be achieved. 
 
1.2. The Political-Ecology of Water and the Urban Process 
 
It is, of course, commonplace to argue that the urbanisation process is predicated 
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upon a myriad of socio-ecological transformations that affect the geographies of places 
both nearby and far away (Cronon, 1991; Hundley, 1992; Gottlieb and Fitzsimmons, 
1991). To the extent that the urban process continues, a more intense process of socio-
environmental transformation is required in order to ‘sustain’ the dynamics of 
contemporary urban change. In the process, of course, new environments  -- varying from 
concrete urban landscapes to new eco-systems (for example, around water reservoirs) – 
are formed. The urbanization process, in sum, presents itself as a historically specific 
accumulation of socio-environmental processes as well as the arena through which these 
transformations take place.  
Although the particular geographical and institutional configurations vary 
significantly from city to city and from country to country, depending on the particular 
combination of physical and institutional factors, the 20th century urbanization process 
and its accompanying expanding use of water significantly affected the spatial 
choreography of urban water circulation. For each of the case study cities, and we can 
safely generalise this argument, the physical-territorial basis on which the successful 
watering of the city rested expanded as cities grew, both in quantitative as well as in 
qualitative terms (Hundley, 1992). Either new untapped water reserves had to be 
incorporated in the urban water cycle or existing water supplies were tapped more 
intensely. In the case of aquifer water, this led to either a problem of widespread over-
pumping that outstripped the natural recharge capacities of aquifers or the urbanization 
process itself contributed to a gradually decreasing quality of aquifer waters (cases of Tel 
Aviv, Athens, or London). In the case of surface waters, the falling water quality 
prompted more sophisticated technological or socio-ecological transformations 
(Amsterdam) and/or the expansion of the managed capacity of surface water flows, often 
to a point of full saturation (Tel Aviv, Seville). The geographical expansion of the 
ecological footprint of urban water not only transformed places and environments far 
removed from the city, but also intensified conflicts with other users over limited water 
supplies. In some cases, the limits of the national hydrological capacity have been reached 
and international solutions sought (as in the case of Israel) or pressures built up to 
integrate regional river-basin based water management systems into a national grid 
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system (as in the case of Spain). During the late 20th century, mounting evidence 
suggested that the sustainability of urban development was bought at the expense of an 
expanding water frontier and of geographically widening the sphere of impact of the 
urban water cycle, leading to often unsustainable practices of expanding resource 
extraction and intensified conflict. In what follows, some of the above arguments will be 
marshalled to elucidate the central trends that characterise contemporary urban water 
management systems. The key points of tension, conflict, rupture, and/or potential crisis 
will be discussed.  
 
2. Critical Moments in the Contemporary Urban Water Cycle 
 
2. 1. The Shifting Political-Economy of Water 
 
The public/private nexus 
 
Despite the raging debates over potential or actual shifts towards privatisation (a 
debate that is often couched in terms of an inevitable and necessary adaptation of national 
policies to the requirements imposed by a new global and de-regulated world economic 
order), our case-studies show that the long history of changes in the urban water supply 
sector have, since the inception of urban water systems, always been characterised by 
shifting configurations of public-private partnerships. Most international studies, 
including METRON (with the exception of Tel Aviv), demonstrate that the organisation 
of urban water supply systems can be broadly divided in four stages. The period up to the 
second half of the 19th century, when most urban water supply systems consisted of 
relatively small private companies providing parts of the city (usually the richer parts) 
with water of varying quality. Water provision was highly stratified and water businesses 
were aimed at generating profits for the investors.  
This was followed by a period of municipalisation, primarily prompted by 
concerns over deteriorating environmental conditions and calls for a sanitised city. In the 
U.K.  – as elsewhere in Europe --  this took the form of a municipal socialism concerned 
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with providing essential public goods at a basic, often highly subsidised, rate (Laski et. 
al., 1935; Millward, 1991). Profitability was without any doubt a secondary concern and 
subsidies came from the general tax income (from either the local or the national state). 
This municipalisation was also supported by local elites whose health and environmental 
conditions were equally negatively affected by deteriorating sanitary standards in the city. 
It was during this era that water supply systems were consolidated, leading to a city-wide 
standardised coverage of domestic water supply, coupled with a comprehensive sewage 
disposal system (albeit without treatment of sewage waters).  
The third phase started  approximately after the First World War when the water 
industry, together with other major utility sectors (such as electricity and telecoms), 
became part of a growing national concern (Bernstein,1955; Littlechild, 1986). The 
national state, with varying degrees of intensity of control, regulation, and investments, 
undertook a much greater role in public services provision (Parker, 1997). Water 
infrastructure became  -- together with other major infrastructure works and programs --   
part of a Fordist-Keynesian State-led social and economic policy. The investments in 
grand infrastructure works (dams, canals, networks) were part of, on the one hand, an  
effort to generate and/or support economic growth, while, on the other hand, assuring a 
relative social peace by means of re-distributive policies (Amin, 1994; Moulaert and 
Swyngedouw, 1987; Gandy, 1997). Three objectives were central to this Fordist period of 
expansion of water provision: the creation of jobs, the generation of demand for 
investment goods from the private sector and, finally, providing basic collective 
production and consumption goods (like water, education, housing) at a subsidised price 
for wage workers and industry alike (Herrington and Price, 1987). This can be identified 
in all our case studies. In some instances, water provision was nationalised (as in the UK 
and, somewhat belatedly after the dictatorship, in Greece). In other cases, although 
management remained under the auspices of municipal authorities, the state played an 
ever-increasing role, particularly in financing infrastructure projects (in Spain and Israel), 
but  also by means of greater regulatory intervention. It was indeed also during this period 
that a variety of regulatory bodies (for social, economic, quality, or environmental 
regulation) were established, usually by and at the level of the national state. These 
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institutional changes also assured that a particular constellation of ‘stake- holders’ would 
become involved.  
During the fourth and most recent phase, roughly starting with the global 
recession of the 1970s associated with the demise of state-led economic growth and the 
subsequent transition to post-Fordist or flexible forms of economic development and state 
guidance, a major shift took place in the public/private interplay in the water sector. First 
of all, mounting economic problems  -- in the context of high social and investment 
spending – resulted in growing budgetary difficulties for the national (and often also 
local) state. This necessitated a reconsideration of the direction of state spending and 
resulted in  reduced expenditures in the welfare sector and in supporting debt-ridden 
industrial sectors or expansive infrastructure programs. The low prices, the subsidised 
water investments, and the ageing water infrastructure, combined with a still growing 
water demand, put an even greater pressure on state budgets; a pressure that ran counter 
to the above processes. Second, the call for greater competitiveness as a means to re-dress 
the economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s prompted a quest for efficiency gains 
and greater productivity through cutting red-tape, labour-market de-regulation, and 
greater investment flexibility. This, in turn, was accompanied by privatisation tendencies 
as a means to pursue both of the above recipe-solutions to the crisis of Fordism. 
Moreover, the growing globalisation of the economy and the accompanying change in the 
nature of competition, the greater availability of private capital achieved by means of de-
regulation and de-territorialisation of financial markets, and the imposition of strict 
budget norms (by the EU) further accelerated the shift of the boundary between the public 
and private sectors in water management more in favour of the latter. Third, the standard 
democratic channels of government often infused by the presence and active lobbying 
power of social organisations  -- most notably unions – proved to be a considerable 
barrier for implementing swift policy-changes. The political-economic configuration has, 
consequently, changed in important ways, resulting in new institutional arrangements (see 
below) that permit a more business- or market-oriented management that is more in tune 
with profit-making strategies. Fourth,  investors began to search for new frontiers for 
capital investment. Nature in all its forms (including the production of new genetic 
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materials) became part and parcel of new accumulation strategies. Water presented itself 
as a possible new frontier to harness, as a potential source for turning H2O into money 
and profit. Fifth, and finally, the growing environmental problems and, consequently, the 
proliferating number of actual and potential conflicts in the management and regulation 
of the water cycle proved to be a serious challenge for traditional forms of organisation 
and implementation of water-related activities. Particularly in a context in which civil 
society-based environmental groups became more vocal and powerful, systems of 
governance had to become more sensitive to these issues.  Particularly questions of 
restricting or controlling demand (demand management) as a strategy to lower water 
consumption and hence taking away the pressures on expanding the urban water resource 
base became more loudly heard. The internalisation of all these tensions within a 
fundamentally state-owned and state-controlled sector like water became increasingly 
difficult (Swyngedouw, 1998).  
The combined effect of the above processes and dynamics resulted in a more or 
less radical shift (and with varying degrees of intensity in different countries), both in 
practice and ideologically/discursively, from a state-led and –managed water sector to one 
that is or has to be more in tune with globalised market forces and with the imperatives of 
a competitive privatised economy. In some cases, actual privatisation has taken place 
(such as in the UK), in other cases (such as in Amsterdam or Seville) publicly owned 
companies are increasingly required to act strategically, managerially, operationally, and 
organisationally as a private company. In addition, water businesses are now often part of 
global multi-location companies and/or part of larger, often global, multi-utility 
conglomerates. 
Clearly, the privatisation debate or actual privatisation process has had (and will 
continue to have) profound implications for the water sector and beyond1. Moreover, in a 
privatised environment (whether still under public ownership or ownership transferred to 
the private sector), the questions and parameters of what constitutes ‘sustainability’ are 
radically different from those associated with other forms of management and control. 
                                                          
1
 However, we cannot dismiss the existence of powerful forces that oppose the privatising agenda or the 
internal contradictions of the privatising model, which has often ended in failure in many cases around the 
world (Savedoff et. al., 1999; Hardoy et. al., 1999; Bond, 1997).      
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This is the theme we turn to in the next section. 
 
Privatising/Commodifying water 
 
Our case studies reveal, with varying degrees of intensity and levels of 
implementation, a tendency towards the total commodification of water. In contrast to 
pre-capitalist and non-Western  practices and ‘cultures’ of water  (many of whom still 
linger on and are treasured by their beholders) that experienced water as a ‘public’ and 
‘common’ good to which anyone who needed it could have access to at a very minimal, 
often negligible, cost, recent discursive shifts and political-institutional changes have 
moved in the direction of transforming water from a good into a commodity (Hassan, 
1998). Regardless of the actual institutional form of organisation of the water sector (i.e. 
private, public, or mixed), the new stage in the commodification of water that started in 
earnest in the 1980s has by now become almost hegemonic.  
In this context, it is important to distinguish between commodification and 
privatisation. While commodification, on the one hand,  refers to turning water from a 
public good into a marketable commodity subject to the principles governing a market 
economy (regardless of the nature of the ownership of both water and the water 
companies) and privatisation, which refers to changing ownership of  water infrastructure 
and/or the management of water services from the public sector to the private sector. In 
this sense, water services in all our cities have become now largely commodified (or are 
in the process of doing so). This has been achieved most fully in the cases of Amsterdam 
and London. Full privatisation has only been implemented in London, while Athens now 
has a mixed pattern (infrastructure is public, management is private for 49%, a percentage 
that is set to increase in the near future). In Seville, the municipal water utility is moving 
in a direction of commodification and full-cost recovery, while the Israeli situation is, of 
course, more complicated and the state keeps a firm grip on the running of water systems. 
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The demand-supply-investment trialectic in a ‘competitive’ context  
 
In a context of commodification and demands for privatisation, the traditional 
state-led way of managing the triad of demand-supply-investment decisions becomes 
fundamentally transformed (see also below). If the profit motive, either for public or 
private companies, becomes the yardstick against which performance is measured (Martin 
and Parker, 1997) and the price signal a key instrument in regulating the demand/supply 
nexus, the contradictions between these moments in the economic process take a rather 
different turn (Littlechild, 1988). In an external context, in which expanding demand is 
seriously discouraged for environmental reasons, while investment needs to be 
maintained to replace and update the network, the balance sheet equations for water 
supply companies become rather specific. With a given demand structure, and with 
increasing investment, profitability (and hence the sustainability of market-led water 
companies) can only be maintained via either productivity increases (which are generally 
capital and technology intensive and almost invariably lead to a rising organic 
composition of capital and a reduction in the work force) and/or price increases. While 
the latter is possible, it remains politically sensitive and might lead to socially perverse 
effects. For example, immediately after privatisation in the UK (1989), the water price 
increased significantly. Many non-paying households were cut-off (a practice that was 
later banned by the New Labour government in 1997), while companies and their share-
holders gained considerable profits (Herbert et. al., 1995). In the second round of price 
setting in 1999 (and after the government introduced a wind-fall tax on what were 
considered to be excessive profits of the privatised utilities), price increases were more 
modest, immediately resulting in a major reduction of the labour force in the water 
industry and calls for a partial re-collectivisation of the water infrastructure. In a context 
of increasing demand and expansion of either total or per capita demand, the volume of 
profits can be maintained by means of an expansion of supply. In this context, it is 
interesting to note that the ‘productivist’ logic of water supply companies continues 
unabated (despite mounting calls for restricted water use). Furthermore, given the long-
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term and capital-intensive nature of investments in water infrastructure, there is a rather 
weak incentive to engage in major long-term and capital-intensive investment programs. 
Put simply, there is a clear disincentive to invest in not directly profitable activities like 
leakage control in contrast to productivity enhancing investments. Finally, in a context of 
geographically limited supply and demand in which most companies operate, while 
simultaneously being exposed to a rapidly globalising competitive environment, there is a 
tendency for privatised water companies to internationalise activities, either by taking 
over privatised water businesses elsewhere or by means of mergers, acquisitions and/or 
diversification into other sectors, or by selling their “know-how” overseas.  
It is not a surprise, therefore, that the state or other parts of the public sector have 
to mediate these contradictions. In the UK, for example, Yorkshire Water proposed to 
collectivise the network part of the water supply system, while keeping the managerial 
part in private hands, while the Welsh water utility also moved away from private 
ownership into some mix of public and private management (OFWAT, 2000b, 2000c). In 
the case of Greece, the preparation for privatisation significantly involved splitting the 
water company into two parts, a publicly owned company that maintained the assets 
(technical infrastructure and network) and a privatised (up to 49%) water supply company 
that would manage the system. It seems that this kind of public-private partnerships, in 
which the public sector is responsible for long-term fixed capital investments (and much 
of the cost associated with them) while the private sector organises the profitable part of 
the system (supply management) is the likely outcome of a privatised water business. 
 
2. 2. A new regulatory order? 
 
De-, Re-, or Non-regulation 
 
The tendency towards commodification and privatisation changes the regulatory 
context in important ways (see also below). While moves towards commodification and 
privatisation are legitimated on the basis of considerations of increased competitiveness, 
higher productivity, lower prices, and drastic cutback of regulatory red tape, there has 
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been a tendency to equate those shifts in the economic forms of organisation with de-
regulation. However, evidence from the water sector from our case studies suggests 
exactly the opposite. Particularly in the case of the UK, the privatisation of the water 
utilities in 1989 was accompanied by new institutions, most notably the economic 
regulatory body OFWAT. Although the main function of OFWAT is the protection of the 
consumer by means of regulating price-setting and investment, the case study shows that, 
over time, this process proved to be full of tensions and conflict, not in the least as a 
result of a great and increasing diversity between water companies, uncertainties about 
available data, and the intricacies of the regulatory game. As Bakker (XXX DATE) has 
pointed out, the regulatory game that started with the privatisation (and ostensibly de-
regulation) of the water industry unleashed a certain regulatory creep, which has 
developed into a top-heavy institutional-regulatory body. Given the territorial monopoly-
character of the privatised water companies, all sort of regulatory procedures, such as 
investment target-setting, pricing, environmental standards, and abstraction and leakage 
standards, quality assurance, and the like, have been implemented. Rather than de-
regulating the water sector, privatisation has resulted in a profound re-regulation of the 
water market and in a considerable quasi-governmental regulatory structure. In the 
process, the set of social actors involved in the institutional and regulatory framework of 
the water sector has been significantly altered, with a new geometry of social power 
evolving as a consequence. This new choreography of institutional and regulatory 
organisation is what we shall turn to next. 
 
The re-scaling of the governance of water: from water government to water governance 
 
A host of new institutional or regulatory bodies have been set-up (in the UK 
appropriately called Quango’s) that have considerable decision-making powers, but 
operate in a shady political arena with little accountability and only limited forms of 
democratic control. These institutional changes have been invariably defined as part of 
wider shift from government to governance (Swyngedouw, 2000). Whereas in the past, 
water management and water policy were directly or indirectly under the control of a 
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particular governmental scale, i.e. either at the national state and/or the local (municipal) 
level, in recent years there has been a massive proliferation of new water-related 
institutions, bodies, and actors that are involved in policy-making and strategic planning 
at a variety of geographical scales. The successive generations of water-related directives 
and regulations at the EU level and the torturous process of implementing an integrated 
EU policy – in the form of the European Water Framework Directive --  have resulted in 
growing powers of the Commission over water-related issues. The political history of the 
successive stages of negotiating the framework directive suggests a rather tumultuous 
path in which various actors (such a national governments, water providers, the 
Commission, the European Parliament, NGOs of a variety of kinds) played different 
roles, while their influence changed over time (Kaika, 2001).  
In addition – as the UK case shows  -- privatisation required setting-up a series of 
new regulatory bodies (OFWAT in particular) and a re-definition of the powers and 
prerogatives of existing regulatory organisations such as those of the National Rivers 
Authority that became integrated in the newly created Environment Agency. Finally, 
privatization itself of course results in much greater power and autonomy in terms of 
strategic and other decision-making for the companies themselves. Privatisation de facto 
means taking away some control from the public sector and transferring this to the private 
sector. This not only changes decision-making procedures and strategic developments, 
but also affects less tangible elements such as access to information and data.  
The combined outcome of the above has been a more or less significant (very 
significant in the case of the UK, less so in the case of, say, the Netherlands) re-
configuration of the scales of water governance. As Bob Jessop (1994) has pointed out for 
other domains of public life, the national scale has been re-defined (and partially 
hollowed-out) in terms of its political power, while supra-national and sub-national 
institutions and forms of governance have become more important. Privatisation, in turn, 
has led to the externalisation of a series of command and control functions. The result is a 
new scalar ‘gestalt’ of governance, characterised by a multi-scaled articulation of 
institutions and actors with varying degrees of power and authority. Traditional channels 
of democratic accountability are hereby cut, curtailed, or re-defined. A plethora of new 
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institutions has been formed at a variety of geographical scales. This proliferation of 
‘governing bodies’ has diminished the transparency of the decision-making process and 
renders it more difficult to disentangle and articulate the power geometries that shape 
decision-making outcomes. In practice, it can be argued that the transition from 
government to governance has implied  despite the multiplication of actors and 
institutions involved in water management the transfer of key economic and political 
powers to the private component of the governance complex. This, however, has not 
happened in a social vacuum and has rather fuelled a constellation of social and political 
conflicts, not least because of the consequences of an increasingly private-oriented 
governance model for the sustainability of socio-environmental systems. 
 
 
2.3. Proliferating socio-spatial and socio-environmental water conflicts. 
 
The widening urban water footprint and the expanding scale of urban water 
operations as a result of either increasing per capita demand and/or a still growing urban 
population results in a continuing need to expand the city’s water resource basis. Despite 
attempts to manage demand, total production capacity has increased in all cases (although 
at a lower rate than in earlier years). This has resulted in either effective growth of water 
extraction and/or growing pressures to expand water production capabilities. At the same 
time, pressures for alternative use of the available water (ecological, recreational, 
industrial, or other) have increased, often in a context of extremely limited quantity or 
unreliable quality of available resources. Although pressures differ from country to 
country and from city to city, they are real and have led to more or less serious conflicts 
or threaten to do so in the near future. The Tel Aviv case is of course the most notorious 
one. In years of limited rainfall, the existing integrated national water system from which 
Tel Aviv draws its water reaches its full capacity. Moreover, some of the aquifer waters 
that were used cannot any longer because of saline water intrusion. Finally, the peace 
process with the Palestinians (perhaps defunct while we write this article) has resulted in 
a promise to divert more water to Gaza where more than a million people live on 
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currently a very limited supply of circa 25 liter/person/day. The negotiations with Syria, 
moreover, on the future of the Golan Heights (of which parts belong to the drainage basin 
of the Lake of Galilee, the most important water source of the country) may also affect 
the total water balance of Israel. Negotiations are currently under way to buy and import 
water from Turkey. The latter has surplus water, partly as a result of the construction of 
the Anatolia water project, which captures headwaters from rivers that are central for 
watering the Kurdish region and other middle-east countries. If this goes ahead, an 
already precarious regional socio-spatial condition will extend its geo-political remit to a 
wider geographical area and intensify an already complex and conflict-ridden situation.  
Less dramatically, the urban water condition in Seville, which is subject to the 
hydrological circumstances of the Guadalquivir river and its tributaries, is directly linked 
with the ever growing needs of the agricultural sector for more irrigation water. The EU’s 
agricultural policy demands ever greater productivity from the agricultural sector, which 
in Andalusia requires greater quantities of regulated irrigation waters. During recurrent 
dry periods, conflicts between the agricultural sector and urban water use need to be 
carefully negotiated politically. Furthermore, the demand for more water from the part of 
the city and its proposed new dam construction meets with ecological objections. 
Conflicts between extracting areas and the expanding water footprint have also been 
identified for Athens, while the new proposed reservoir by Thames Water for the supply 
of London and its region is highly controversial. For Amsterdam, the dune-based water 
storage and purification system is under pressure from continuing urbanization processes. 
In sum, the expanding water frontier of urban water meets with increasing resistance and 
is characterised by intensifying conflict around a series of tension-lines.  
In addition to these socio-environmental and spatial conflicts, the drive towards 
privatisation has re-opened the debate over the status of  water. While general access to 
water at a very low or moderate price for the whole population was the received wisdom 
during the ‘Statist’ period, current practices, aimed at running water services according to 
the market logic, re-opened the debate over water accessibility. In Britain, for example, 
the growing number of people that were disconnected from water supply because of non-
payment rose sharply during the first years after privatisation (Herbert et. al., 1995). 
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Eventually, on the basis of growing concerns with rising social exclusion and health risks, 
the government (like in other countries) was forced to pass legislation that banned 
disconnection and obliged water companies to deliver a minimum volume of water.  
 
2.4. The Discourse of Crisis and its Politics: the contested politics of demand 
management. 
 
The discursive production of ’scarcity’  
 
In all of our case studies, increasing attention is paid to demand management, 
mainly as a result of the growing environmental awareness and the risk of dwindling 
water resources, which has intensified the political and social debate about the ‘scarcity’ 
of water (Nevarez, 1996). As Kaika (1999) has pointed out, this discursive built-up of a 
particular water narrative and ideology, particularly noticeable during, for example, the 
drought-related crisis conditions in Athens in the early eighties, serves specific political 
and economic objectives and policies. A climate of actual, pending, or imagined water 
crisis not only serves to facilitate further investment in the expansion of the water-supply 
side (as in the case of Athens or Seville), it also fuels and underpins drives towards 
commodification. As the price signal is hailed as a prime mechanism to manage 
‘scarcity’, the discursive construction of water as a ‘scarce’ good becomes an important 
part of a strategy towards commodification, if not privatisation. In this context, strange 
and often unholy political alliances are forged between free marketeers and parts of the 
environmental movement. While the latter’s concern about the increasing, but socially 
constructed, scarcity of water and their growing effectiveness in mediatising this message 
to the wider public, a greater willingness-to-pay and the acceptance of the market 
mechanism as the preferred signal to socially allocate the resource becomes seen as more 
acceptable, if not presented as the only alternative available.   
 
The politics of the technological fix. 
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The management of the urban water cycle and, in particular, the management of 
demand operates largely via a combination of campaigns aimed at raising public 
awareness about water savings on the one hand, and attempts at reducing water 
consumption by means of a variety of technological fixes on the other. Generally the cost 
effectiveness of water saving devices depends both on the price of the technology and the 
price of water. In a context of low water prices, water-saving devices are often not cost-
effective. Although it is still disputed what the aggregate effect is on water savings (most 
studies indicate a slow-down in the growth of water demand, but not a reversal of upward 
trends), the technological fix for water-related problems requires significant investments. 
Privatised water companies remain reluctant to invest in such technologies (given the cost 
implication), while public subsidies might be seen as a subvention to the private sector (in 
the case of a privatised water sector) or run against the dominant ideology of full cost 
recovery (in case of public companies). In addition, EU competition regulations might 
ban such state support. Despite availability, therefore, of a wide range of water-saving 
devices and technologies, uptake remains limited and is not likely to have a major impact 
in the near future. More importantly, the displacement effects (in terms of the 
environmental implications associated with the development and production of new 
technologies) is almost invariably completely ignored and not part of the environmental 
audit. Yet, it is abundantly clear that environment-friendly technologies when applied in 
one sector might have adverse effects in terms of the environmental effects of their own 
production process. A total environmental audit would be required in order to assess the 
net environmental benefit derived from a technological fix.   
 
2.5. Globalising H2O and uneven development 
 
The commodification and privatisation of H2O is increasingly embedded in processes of 
economic globalisation. Whether publicly or privately owned, water businesses are 
increasingly expanding their operations geographically and become embedded in an 
international competitive process. In the case of privatised companies, furthermore, their 
capital structure is also becoming increasingly internationalised. For example, after the 
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UK government opened the water sector to market competition in December 1994, a 
frenzied merger and take-over activity started to take place. Many UK water companies 
are actively acquiring water operations elsewhere in the world, while British companies 
have been subject to take-overs from foreign competitors. For instance, Thames Water 
(London’s water supply company) was acquired in September 2000 by the German multi-
utility RWE. At a global scale, an accelerated process of concentration and consolidation 
is taking place that is rapidly leading to a fairly oligopolistic economic structure of water 
utility companies on a world scale. Regardless of the difficulties of regulating global 
companies (particularly with respect to environmental and social standards, investments, 
maintenance and infrastructure upkeep), it raises the spectre of increasing geographical 
strategies around investments and about the spread of activities, the flow of water-capital, 
and the portfolio of holdings. In addition, it opens the possibility of withdrawal of water 
companies from particular places and sites, opens up the possibility of strategic cherry-
picking and might even lead to bankruptcies or liquidation of activities. For a sensitive 
and vital sector like urban water supply, each of the above might potentially threaten 
urban sustainability conditions. In addition, it might lead to a situation in which the 
necessary provision of water for more problematic (i.e. costly) areas of the city has to be 
undertaken by the public sector, while the private sector picks places that optimise 
corporate profitability.  
 
3. Crisis moments and tendencies: a question of sustainability? 
 
3.1. What needs to be sustained?  
 
The political-ecological assessment of the urban water cycle raises serious issues 
with respect to the debate on sustainability and its political practice. Although the concept 
of ‘sustainability’, given its well-known and well-documented inherent ambiguity and 
messy definition (Wilbanks, 1994), remains widespread and widely-used (often exactly 
because of its imprecise, diffuse, and multiple interpretative meanings) in policy 
documents and debates. A political-ecological perspective maintains that ‘sustainability’ 
 20 
is necessarily a chaotic concept unless a clear and explicit specification is given of who 
decides what needs to be sustained for whom, where, and why (Robinson, 1994). Socio-
ecological processes are inherently uneven, both in terms of their costs and benefits in 
social, economic, environmental, or cultural terms. Moreover, ecological effects and 
social implications cannot be easily separated from each other. A political-ecological 
approach would be more concerned with analysing and proposing the substantive and 
procedural mechanisms through which a more equitable choreography of social power is 
achieved in terms of the particular kinds of socio-ecological environments that shall be 
produced. In this sense, ‘sustainability’ is invariably positioned or situated (Haraway, 
1991; 1997). In sum, urban sustainability refers here to the capacities individuals and 
social groups have in producing the socio-environmental conditions of which they are 
part without violating the rights of others to do so as well (Harvey, 1996). A pivotal 
criterion here is to achieve an equitable distribution of social power and a transparent and 
democratic decision-making procedure. The critical moments of the urban water cycle as 
elucidated in part II will be translated here in terms of questions of sustainability as 
defined above. 
 
3.2. Urban sustainability and critical moments in the water cycle 
 
Urban water:  public good or private commodity? 
 
The recent shift towards turning H2O into a commodity has profound implications 
on the social and political meaning and cultural valuation of water.  First of all, water is 
turned into profits and capital accumulation by private or public/private institutions. 
Supplying water becomes hereby a means to achieve an economic goal post: economic 
growth and profit maximisation. To the extent that private companies do this, water-
related activities become just a strategic element within a predominantly corporate 
strategy of companies that are becoming rapidly multi-utility and international. Second, 
non-economic uses and functions of water have then to be regulated by governmental 
institutions that often face serious opposition, conflict, or other constraints in the face of 
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powerful private agencies. Moreover, it becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible, 
to integrate water policies within a wider urban, social, or economic policy that would 
involve cross-subsidisation, alternative uses of water, or a socially stratified policy. Third, 
this shift inevitably entails a change in the geometry of social power. Private actors and 
companies become much more powerful voices in strategic water-related decisions, at the 
expense of other civil society organisations or of the state. Fourth, while the water cycle 
operates on temporal rhythms that are part of the larger environmental system, it is 
nevertheless increasingly forced to operate under the standard discounting periods of 
corporate strategists and of economic cycles. Fifth, the privatised nature of crucial parts 
of the water cycle diminishes the transparency of decision-making procedures and limits 
access to data and information that could permit other social groups to acquire the 
relevant information on which to base views, decisions, and options. Finally, water 
production and distribution becomes incorporated into an increasingly global economy in 
which investment flows, financial capital markets, and investment decisions shape the 
contours in which the urban water economy operate. In sum, the shift from public good to 
private commodity alters the choreography of power through which the urban socio-
hydrological cycle in organised.  
 
The supply/demand nexus and the investment/pricing conundrum 
 
At a moment when the price signal becomes a central organising principle of 
water markets, and in a context of relatively fixed supplies, demand management 
becomes tricky business. Monopolistic market control that is inevitably associated with 
water supply networks demands a strong price-regulation by the State or other 
governmental agencies. In addition, efforts to reduce water consumption for 
environmental reasons is countered by cost-recovery requirements that hinge on price 
setting and produced quantities. Invariably, water companies are operating in the two-
pronged wedge of price-setting regulatory systems on the one hand and costly 
technological/organisational investments to enhance productivity on the other. The triad 
investment/price/supply becomes very difficult to manage, particularly in a context of 
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increasing pressures to reduce demand. All case studies suggest a continuing tendency to 
increase supply despite rhetorical attention to demand management. The costly 
introduction of water saving technologies is, at best, slow, while major efforts are made 
to increase supply despite often formidable opposition. It is becoming abundantly clear 
that the price signal is insufficient to regulate the allocation and efficient use of a resource 
like water. Particularly when ecological or cultural aspects play an increasingly important 
role, the regulation of which demands political rather than economic instruments.  
 
Socio-spatial struggle over water   
 
The twin tension of continuing increasing demand for urban water on the one 
hand and the mounting pressure to allocate water to other functions on the other has 
proliferated socio-spatial tensions and conflict over water abstraction, water allocation, 
and water use. These conflicts can take a variety of forms, ranging from a growing social 
differentiation within the city in terms of water consumption, conflicts over urban versus 
agricultural, industrial, or ecological use, to conflicts between resource extraction areas 
and urban consumption areas (reflected in conflicts over new reservoirs or dam 
constructions). In addition, the globalisation of water companies signals a strategy in 
which local waters, turned into capital, are geographically re-allocated to other places and 
cities. For example, London’s water company has taken over part of Jakarta’s water 
supply system. Invariably, the outcome of these struggles and conflicts is expressive of 
the uneven power relations that infuse the organisation of the hydro-cycle.  
 
New actors and grey accountability  
 
The proliferation of regulatory bodies and systems of governance associated with 
the hydro-cycle, at local, national, or international scales, has contributed to the 
emergence of a ‘thick’ regulatory structure, at least in developed countries, with 
ambiguously defined responsibilities and an imprecisely defined accountability. 
Depending on the geographical scale of organisation or on the particular institutional 
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embedding of the water companies, a differing set of actors is involved in the decision-
making procedures. The choreography of ‘stake-holder’ participation is uneven and 
unequal and, in many instances, operating outside traditional political democratic 
channels. While some actors are well represented in some settings, they are excluded 
from others; still others remain totally absent from the arenas of power where 
fundamental decisions are made.  
 
 
Water and market risk: The globalisation of water and uneven development 
 
To the extent that water companies operate increasingly as private economic 
actors, they are also increasingly subject to standard market risks. While providing a 
fundamental and essential service, the economic survival of water operations is not 
necessarily guaranteed. Take-overs, disinvestments, geographical re-allocation, 
bankruptcies, inefficient operations, and the like are of course endemic to a private 
market economy. In fact, this is exactly what market dynamics are supposed to do, i.e. to 
weed out under-performing companies, and to re-allocate economic resources from less 
to more profitable activities. This raises particular questions with respect to the long-term 
sustainability of market-based urban water supply systems. In absence of strong 
incentives to enhance productivity or efficiency, and given the high cost and long time 
horizon of fixed capital investments in water infrastructure, private companies may fail to 
keep water systems running efficiently. This would, in the medium term, lead to a 
situation in which the State (at whatever level) has to get involved again in the water 
sector in more direct ways. This is already clear in the UK context (as well as in Athens). 
There is a tendency to leave the network/infrastructure part of urban water networks to 
the public sector, while profitable operational and managerial activities are secured by 
private companies. This entails, in fact, an indirect subsidy of the private sector by the 
state and, in market terms, distorts the operation of the market. In fact, in a context in 
which risk of failure of water supply is too dramatic to contemplate, the state will have to 
remain (are become again) a key player in organising water supply systems. This will 
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become even more pronounced as environmental and sanitary standards in urban areas 
continue to decline. 
Moreover, risk of failure does not only pit urban residents against water suppliers, 
but failing or too expensive a water supply brings also serious risk to other economic 
sectors. To the extent that urban economies are increasingly service-based, a mixture of 
business and personal service activities, tourism, and spectacular urban festivals, reliable 
and cheap urban water supply (like other collective means of production) is a key 
ingredient to the economic success of cities.  
 
4. Conclusion: Producing sustainable urban environments  
 
Producing sustainable urban environments, therefore, requires a political and 
administrative system that involves all relevant social actors at all geographical scales. In 
addition, it requires a policy framework that does not isolate the circulation of water from 
other sustainability-related processes. In fact, it requires a more comprehensive and 
integrated approach in which supply of water is integrated with health and sanitation 
policy, ecological considerations, socio-economic processes, and urban planning and 
governance systems. The increasing fragmentation of policy domains (partly as a result of 
commodification and privatisation) makes this objective more remote than ever.  
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